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INTRODUCTION: WORKING TOWARD FAIR 
TREATMENT FOR RETAIL INVESTORS 
Barbara Black* 
Twenty years ago, in ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon, I 
the Supreme Court held that brokerage firms could require their 
customers to arbitrate all their disputes in industry-sponsored fora-a 
decision that had great significance for the law of arbitration as well as 
securities regulation. In 1996, a blue-ribbon task force released its 
report,2 assessing the secuntles arbitration process at National 
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) the principal securities 
arbitration forum,3 and the report led to several symposia on the topic 
coinciding with the tenth anniversary of McMahon.4 Since then, 
arbitration scholars and practitioners have intensified the debate over the 
fairness of arbitration, both generally5 and specifically in the context of 
brokerage customers' disputes.
6 
In addition, in the last ten years, the 
stock market has undergone a boom and bust cycle that generated a 
record number of customers' claims filed at NASD;7 the securities 
* Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of 
Cincinnati College of Law. My gratitude goes to all the Symposium participants, each of whom causes 
me to think more deeply about these issues, and to the Corporate Law Fellows and members of the 
University 0/ Cincinnati Law Review, for their assistance in putting on this Symposium. 
\. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
2. SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM: REpORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE TO 
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC. (1996). 
This report is commonly referred to as the Ruder Report, after the name of its Chair, David S. Ruder, a 
former Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chair. See Press Release, NASD, Arbitration Task 
Force Issues 70 Recommendations in Largest Revamping of Securities Arbitration Since Its Start More 
Than a Century Ago (Jan. 22, 1996), available at http://www.finra.orgiPressRoom/NewsReleases 
II 996NewsReleases/pOl 0550. 
3. Effective July 2007, the arbitration functions of N ASD and the N ew York Stock Exchange 
were consolidated as part of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the largest non-
governmental regulator for securities firms doing business in the United States. See FINRA, About the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, available at http://www.finra.orgiAboutFINRAICorporatelnfo 
rmationlindex.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008). 
4. See, e.g., Symposium, Securities Arbitration: A Decade After McMahon, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 
1329 (1996). 
5. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimal Quality in Mass Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REv. 
383 (2008) (reviewing the literature). 
6. See Bibliography o/Selected Securities Arbitration Resources/rom 1997-2007,76 U. CrN. L. 
REV. 599 (2008). 
7. A record 8945 customers' claims were filed in 2003, in contrast to 5631 claims filed in 1996. 
See FINRA, Dispute Resolution Statistics, http://www.finra.orgiArbitrationMediationiFINRADispute 
ResolutioniStatistics/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2008). 
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industry has continued to market new investment products, strategies, 
and services for retail investors;8 and the aging population has 
increasingly become aware of the importance of investing for retirement, 
but has also become susceptible to deceptive promises offering freedom 
from financial worries.9 As a result of these developments, now is an 
opportune time for a re-examination of arbitration and investors' 
remedies. The March 31, 2007 Symposium provided just such an 
opportunity, and I am proud to introduce the participants' Articles, each 
of which is an important contribution to the scholarship in this area. 
Professor Jeffrey Stempel and Professor Stephen Ware address the 
question of fairness in "mass," or consumer, arbitration, of which 
securities arbitration is a prime example. Professor Stempel is a forceful 
advocate of government-mandated procedural and substantive ground 
rules to ensure the fair and effective operation of mass arbitration. In 
particular, he argues that the judicial process should be the benchmark 
for measuring the quality of arbitration. lo Professor Stephen Ware 
focuses on an often-overlooked mandatory aspect of securities 
arbitration that conflicts with the contractual basis for arbitration. II 
Under NASD rules, brokerage firms are required to arbitrate customers' 
disputes if the customer so chooses.1 2 As a result, even if a brokerage 
firm wished to resolve customers' disputes in court, it would still be 
required to arbitrate at an individual customer's request. Professor Ware 
raises the intriguing possibility that at least some firms might be willing 
to drop their arbitration agreements if NASD did not impose a duty on 
brokerage firms to arbitrate, allowing a customer for whom judicial 
resolution of disputes was important to select a brokerage firm on that 
basis. 
Professor Jennifer Johnson and Professor Edward Brunet, on the one 
8. One example is the marketing of fee-based accounts instead of the traditional commission-
based accounts. The D.C. Circuit struck down the SEC's controversial rule that would have exempted 
brokers offering fee-based accounts from regulation as investment advisers. See Financial Planning 
Ass'n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
9. According to the SEC, "Nearly one-third of all U.S. investors are between 50 and 64 years of 
age, and approximately 5 million senior citizens succumb to financial abuse each year." SEC, For 
Seniors, http://www.sec.govlinvestor/seniors.shtml(lastvisitedJan.30.2008).In 2004, NASD Investor 
Education Foundation awarded a research grant to WISE Senior Services in Los Angeles to investigate 
fraud that targets older Americans. Its counter-intuitive finding was that investment fraud victims 
demonstrated a better understanding of basic financial literacy than non-victims. See NASD INVESTOR 
EDUC. FOUND., INVESTOR FRAUD STUDY FINAL REpORT (2006), available at 
http://www.finrafoundation.orgIWISE_InvestorJraud_StudyJinal_Report.pdf. 
10. See Stempel, supra note 5. 
II. See Stephen J. Ware, What Makes Securities Arbitration DifJerentfrom Other Consumer and 
Employment Arbitration?, 76 U. CIN. L REv. 447 (2008). 
12. Similarly, Professor Ware also objects to the SRO requirement that securities employees 
arbitrate their employment disputes. See id. 
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hand, and Professor Jill Gross, on the other, deal specifically with the 
issue of fairness in securities arbitration. Professor Johnson and 
Professor Brunet assert that the greatest defect in the securities 
arbitration process is the failure of the NASD forum to require its 
arbitrators to apply substantive law, with the result that the application 
of substantive law occurs sporadically and inconsistently in present-day 
securities arbitration. 13 In contrast, Professor Gross argues that 
criticisms of the fairness of securities arbitration stem primarily from 
misunderstandings of the law, not from defects in the process or failures 
of the arbitrators. 14 Investors' dissatisfaction with the securities 
arbitration forum may well result not from deficiencies in the forum's 
procedures or with its arbitrators, but from the application of anti-
investor laws. Accordingly, since current law severely limits investors' 
remedies in court, investors may actually fare better in arbitration. 
I have outlined above the major issues on which the professors 
disagree, but I am struck by the major areas of agreement as well. In 
contrast to many investors' perceptions as reported in the media,15 all the 
professors reflect, to varying degrees, a consensus that NASD 
procedures are fair, setting aside the controversy over the presence of a 
non-public, or "industry," arbitrator on every three-person arbitration 
panel. 16 Thus, the debate crystallizes around the application of 
substantive law in securities arbitration and the appropriate role for 
judicial review. Requiring arbitrators to apply the substantive law 
would have significant impact on the arbitration forum. First, the role of 
the arbitrators would be primarily that of judges and not that of a jury. 
Accordingly, arbitrators would need additional training in the applicable 
law. This, however, presupposes the existence of applicable law, which 
is problematic since McMahon's privatization of the law. Second, the 
composition of the arbitration panels would also need to change and 
consist primarily, if not exclusively, of lawyers. Certain investors' 
advocates, however, would not welcome these developments, as they 
believe that more favorable outcomes are likely when arbitrators reflect 
13. See Edward Brunet & Jennifer J. Johnson, Substantive Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 
U. CIN. L. REv. 4S9 (2008). 
14. See Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities 
Arbitration, 76 U. ON. L. REv. 493 (2008). 
IS. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Dear S.E.c., Reconsider Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 
2007, § 3, available at http://select.nytimes.comJ2007/0SI06Ibusiness/yourrnoney/06gret.html? 
pagewanted= I &n=Top/ReferencelTimes%20Topics/PeoplelM/Morgenson, %20Gretchen&_r= 1#. 
16. Rule 12402 of the NASD Customer Code of Arbitration requires that every three-person 
arbitration panel include one non-public (commonly referred to as "industry") arbitrator, as defined in 
Rule 12100(p). NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER DISPUTES, R. 12402 (Nat'l 
Ass'n Sec. Dealers, Inc. 2007), available at http://www.finra.orglweb/groupslrules_regs/documents 
lrule_fiIinglpOI836S.pdf. 
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the real-life experiences of their investor-clients. 17 
Moreover, all of the professors agree that the current level of judicial 
involvement does not provide for meaningful review of the substance of 
the arbitrators' decisions; they disagree, however, on whether it should. 
Allowing for greater judicial review of the substance of the arbitrators' 
decision would require not just the preservation of the arbitration record 
(which NASD already requires), but also at least some statement by the 
arbitrators of the reasons for their decision as well as development of a 
judicial standard of review more searching than "manifest disregard of 
the law.,,18 However, when NASD proposed a rule change requiring 
arbitrators to give reasons for their decision if requested by the 
customer, the response from investors' advocates was lukewarm. 19 As a 
practical matter, greater judicial review of arbitration awards would 
increase the workload of the judiciary, a result that is at odds with the 
Supreme Court's pro-arbitration policy. As a matter of policy, more 
judicial involvement in the arbitration process would also mark the 
culmination of efforts to transform the arbitration process into a minor 
league judicial system. While the advisability of this policy is worthy of 
debate, adoption of this approach, with its attendant greater 
responsibilities on arbitrators, is unlikely to work under the current 
securities arbitration system of nonprofessional arbitrators who serve on 
an occasional basis, with minimal compensation.20 
Since much of the current debate centers around the role of 
substantive law in securities arbitration, the contributions of Professor 
Jennifer O'Hare and Professor Mercer Bullard permit useful 
comparisons of the judicial and arbitration systems with their thoughtful 
analyses of the law on remedies as it affects two categories of retail 
investors whose claims are litigated in court: the investor who sues the 
corporate issuer for securities fraud and the mutual fund investor who 
sues the fund and its affiliates for mispricing and sales abuses. Professor 
O'Hare explores the "distinctly anti-investor flavor" to federal securities 
laws that disadvantages, in particular, defrauded retail investors and 
demonstrates that anti-investor bias is real and, given the deregulatory 
climate, unlikely to change.21 Her conclusion-that retail investors have 
17. The Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association (PIABA) has encouraged recruitment of 
arbitrators from diverse segments of the community. See Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association, 
https:llsecure.piaba.org/piabaweblhtmllindex.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2008). 
18. See Gross, supra note 14 (noting the limits of the "manifest disregard" standard). 
19. See Barbara Black & Jill Gross, The Explained Award of Damocles: Protection or Peril in 
Securities Arbitration, 34 SEC. REG. L.J. 17 (2006). 
20. See Barbara Black, Do We Expect Too Much From NASD Arbitrators?, SEC. ARB. 
COMMENTATOR, Oct. 2004, at I. 
21. Jennifer O'Hare, Retail Investor Remedies under Rule IOb-5, 76 U. CIN. L. REv. 521 (2008). 
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no choice but to view false corporate disclosure as just another cost of 
investing or to invest in mutual funds-is especially disturbing, in light 
of Professor Bullard's examination of the legal obstacles confronting 
mutual fund investors.22 
Professor Bullard explores the possible impact of Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo23 and its interpretation of loss causation 
on claims asserted by mutual fund investors. He warns that Dura could 
foreclose all private claims against mutual funds, if applied consistently 
with loss causation involving operating companies. Courts would have 
to treat "value" and "loss" differently in the mutual fund context to 
permit claims based on misleading information about their services and 
sales practices. Professor Bullard concludes that courts should interpret 
the loss causation requirement in a way that treats mutual funds as both 
investments and service providers and recognizes that they are 
fundamentally different from operating companies. Unfortunately, the 
courts' consistent track record of failing to recognize mutual fund 
investors' claims24 gives little reason to be optimistic about how they 
will apply Dura to mutual fund claims. 
Why are both categories of retail investors disfavored in the law? 
Two obvious explanations are politics and policy. Congress and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are subject to political 
pressure by well-organized and well-funded groups representing 
business interests,25 and retail investors do not have lobbyists on K 
Street. It may also reflect a decision that strong government 
enforcement to deter violations is a better policy choice than private 
securities litigation. In the last twenty years, Congress has consistently 
increased SEC enforcement remedies26 and created substantial barriers 
to private securities litigation.27 
More fundamentally, I believe that the disfavored treatment of retail 
investors reflects a deep cynicism not only in our judicial system but 
22. Mercer E. Bullard, Dura, Loss Causation and Mutual Funds: A Requiem/or Private Claims?, 
76 U. CIN. L. REV. 559 (2008). 
23. 544 U.s. 336 (2005). 
24. See Bullard, supra note 22, at nn.5-6 and accompanying text. 
25. Fonner SEC Chair Arthur Levitt described the intense pressure he experienced from 
members of Congress who received political contributions from the accounting industry when he 
attempted to tighten accounting rules. See ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL 
STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA DON'T WANT You TO KNow, WHAT You CAN Do TO FIGHT BACK 
236-239 (2002). 
26. See, e.g., Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Refonn Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.c.); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. \07-204, § 308,116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (Supp. V 2005». 
27. Private Securities Litigation Refonn Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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more generally in our society. In her recent book, Trust and Honesty, 
Professor Tamar Frankel writes of the creation of a culture where fraud 
and dishonesty become pervasive, accepted, and glorified. 28 In this 
culture, "[bJlaming the victims establishes a reciprocal arrangement, in 
which both parties are at fault. ,,29 The truth of this statement is 
illustrated by the law's lack of sympathy for the gullible, unsophisticated 
investor.3o According to the law, reasonable investors are expected to 
possess a certain level of understanding and sophistication to withstand 
broker-dealer conduct. They should understand the time-value of 
money, principles of diversification and risk, the securities industry's 
compensation structure,31 as well as the differences between securities 
brokers, investment advisers, and financial planners.32 Reasonable 
investors should not succumb to brokers' advertising claims,33 even 
though brokerage firms spend millions of dollars in advertising to 
convince investors that they should be their trusted financial advisors.34 
Another tactic to shift the blame to investors is to call them "greedy." 
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, after the bubble burst in the 
early 2000s, was quoted as condemning as a "disgrace" the alleged 
fraudulent accounting, but he went on to say that those who have been 
buying stocks at multiples that "never made any sense" should also look 
in the mirror: "They're as responsible, I think, as those who actually 
committed the crimes of misstating earnings and fudging the 
numbers. ,,35 
Most illustrative is the late Judge Irving Pollack's dismissal of a 
securities fraud class action brought by investors who alleged that they 
were harmed by deceptive recommendations made by securities 
analysts.36 Although the plaintiffs' case had difficulties, the vehemence 
28. TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA'S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 
(2006). 
29. Id. at 35 (emphasis added). 
30. See, e.g., Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1033 (2d Cir. 1993)(holding that 
a widow with a tenth grade education and no prior investment experience could not recover damages 
from her broker who put her in a limited partnership interest that was unsuitable for her investment 
objectives because she should have read and understood the prospectus). 
31. See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in 
Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 991, 1037 (2002). 
32. See Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisers-What's in a Name?, II FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 31,35-39 (2005). 
33. For a devastating critique of the "puffery" defense, see Jennifer O'Hare, The Resurrection of 
the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-Emergence of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 
59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697 (1998). 
34. See Black, supra note 32, at 32 (describing how "prime time television advertising extolling 
the services of brokerage firms has become part of American culture"). 
35. FRANKEL, supra note 28, at 35-36 (emphasis added). 
36. See In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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in his opinion was stunning. He stated that the plaintiffs wanted: 
to twist the federal securities laws into a scheme of cost-free speculators' 
insurance .... [P]laintiffs would have this Court conclude that the federal 
securities laws were meant to underwrite, subsidize, and encourage their 
rash speculation in joining a freewheeling casino that lured thousands 
obsessed with the fantasy of Olympian riches, but which delivered such 
riches to only a scant handful oflucky winners.37 
This "blame the investor" sentiment is not new, as this statement from 
the House of Representatives debate on the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 illustrates: "I also recognize another man who is very largely 
responsible for the misfortunes of the country and the excessive stock 
speculation and debacle. That is Mr. American Citizen who wants to get 
something for nothing.,,38 To what extent this unsympathetic treatment 
of the retail investor is bound up in our culture of rugged individuaIism39 
or instead is the result of conscious governmental policies40 is beyond 
the scope of this brief introduction. 
The central theme of this Symposium is fair treatment for investors. 
All the professors at the Symposium emphasize the importance to the 
capital markets that investors perceive that they are treated fairly;41 all of 
them express, to varying degrees, concerns about investors' fair 
treatment. Yet retail investors continue to open brokerage accounts and 
invest in corporate stocks directly or through mutual funds. This raises 
an issue that may be more sociological than legal. How can we explain 
investors' continued confidence in the capital markets given the abysmal 
record of investor protection, particularly in the area of mutual funds, 
which, at least until the recent market-timing scandals,42 enjoyed a 
reputation as the best investment strategy for the retail investor to 
achieve a well-diversified, well-managed portfolio at low cost? Are 
they, as Professor O'Hare suggests, simply accepting it as a cost of 
investing, just like commissions or mutual fund fees? Perhaps, then, as 
37. Id. at 358. 
38. 78 CONGo REC. 7861, 7862 (1934) (statement of Rep. Lea), reprinted in 1 FED. BAR ASS'N, 
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 853 (1983). 
39. See, e.g., Puckett V. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 587 So.2d 273, 278 (Miss. 1991) 
(holding that a self-directed investor who lost over $2 million, including his retirement fund, in 
commodities futures trading had no claim against his broker, reasoning, "One word encompasses all the 
grandeur and majesty of western civilization. That word is 'freedom.' ... Not as well recognized, but 
equally true is that the absolute concomitant offreedom is responsibility."). 
40. FRANKEL, supra note 28, at 58. 
41. On the importance of the participants' perceptions that the process is fair, see Nancy A. 
Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social Justice 
Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49, 52 (2004). 
42. See Tamar Frankel & Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Mysterious Ways of Mutual Funds: 
Market Timing, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 235,236 (2006). 
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Professor Gross states, investors' perceptions that they are being treated 
unfairly cause them to focus their dissatisfaction on the securities 
arbitration process as an outlet for their frustration.43 Accepting these 
realities, then, it is incumbent that (1) the securities arbitration process is 
a fair process and is perceived as such, and (2) regulators are vigilant in 
promulgating investor protection measures and enforcing them 
aggressively. 
The Symposium concluded with a roundtable discussion as a 
distinguished panel of regulators and practitioners assessed the current 
state of securities arbitration. I include an annotated synopsis44 of the 
participants' remarks because of the importance of the topic. Each 
participant discusses the current "hot" issues from his or her vantage 
point and demonstrates that, whatever the drawbacks in the current 
system, it does not lack for continual reevaluation from the regulators 
and practitioners in the field. 
43. See Gross, supra note 14. Many investors' claims involving mutual funds are brought in 
arbitration against the brokers who recommended particular funds to their customers. Id. 
44. The Current State of Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CrN. L. REv. 589 (2008). In addition, the 
Symposium issue includes a bibliography of selected securities arbitration resources from 1997-2007, 
updating an earlier bibliography included in the Brooklyn Law Review 10th Anniversary Symposium. 
